Multipath communications at the Internet scale have been a myth for a long time, with no actual protocol being deployed at large scale. Recently, the Multipath Transmission Control Protocol (MPTCP) extension was standardized and is undergoing rapid adoption in many different use-cases, from mobile to fixed access networks, from data-centers to core networks. Among its major benefits -i.e., reliability thanks to backup path rerouting, throughput increase thanks to link aggregation, and confidentiality being more difficult to intercept a full connection -the latter has attracted lower attention. How effective would be to use MPTCP, or an equivalent multipath transport layer protocol, to exploit multiple Internet-scale paths and decrease the probability of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks is a question which we try to answer. By analyzing the Autonomous System (AS) level graph, we identify which countries and regions show a higher level of robustness against MITM AS-level attacks, for example due to core cable tapping or route hijacking practices. 1
art to the best of our knowledge, and going beyond the preliminary study 155 presented in [43] , we attempt to provide a response to such questions. 156 
Methodology 157
In this section, we first give a description on the datasets used for con-158 structing a representative AS-level graph of Internet, the basis for our anal-159 ysis. Then, we describe our approach for computing the number of valid 160 vertex-disjoint paths between two arbitrary nodes over the constructed graph. 161 Finally, we detail how we evaluate path diversity at different geographical 162 scopes. The datasets we employed as well as our scripts are given in [41] 163 for the sake of reproducibility. Figure 2 gives a schematic illustration of the 164 different blocks of our measurement methodology. 165 It is worth noting that our methodologies imply that there is a way for a 166 single MPTCP connection to have access to the network path diversity, by 167 means of ad-hoc signaling or specific APIs. Solutions exist in this direction, 168 as described in [35, 18] . 169 6 3.1. Graph construction it with the inter-AS relationship data [4] (i.e., indicating which AS is provider, execution time. In such a scale-free graph, the diameter (i.e., the length of 202 the longest path among all the shortest paths) is not too high. Thus, the 203 average path length (measured in number of AS hops) connecting any pair 204 of nodes in the AS-level graph of Internet is around 5 as of today [38] (note 205 that it is a bit lower with IPv6). 206 Searching for paths in a scale-free graph, i.e., a graph with a large minority 207 of hub nodes connecting the rest of the nodes, is a problem of controllable 208 complexity when adopting breadth or depth-first search algorithms with a 209 limited depth; indeed, fixing a limited depth to a graph search, and that for a 210 scale-free graph that has a limited diameter, strongly decreases the number 211 of explored branches in the graph exploration 3 . From the constructed AS 212 graph G, the breadth-first search algorithm we describe in Alg. 1 can be 213 applied to discover all the policy-compliant paths between two nodes s and 214 d, in a reasonable time.
215
Alg. 1 works as follows: (i) starting from the origin s, the algorithm 216 explores every adjacent node n of s. (ii) A queue P is introduced to keep 217 track of the explored paths; initially, it includes all the paths from s to n.
218
(iii) Following these paths, the algorithm continues discovering the adjacent 219 nodes to look for destination d. (iv) For a path p dequeued from P , the last 220 node n is extracted, all of its neighbors are checked in sequence to determine 221 the valid next hops towards d. (v) Once a neighbor is determined as valid, 222 link to that neighbor will be added into the current path forming a new valid 223 path toward destination. This new explored path is then enqueued into P for 224 the next discovering phase. (vi) A node is considered as valid once the path 225 through it does not violate the valley-free routing property [28] 4 ; we express 226 such policy-compliant path (i.e., a path that complies with the valley-free 227 routing policy), using the following regular expression c2p * p2p?p2c * [37] in 228 which c2p, p2p and p2c denote the relationship between interconnected nodes 229 (where ? means that you can have one or none p2p link). 230 3 breadth-first search explore first all the neighbors of a node, and then explore deeper in the graph; depth-first search, instead, explore first in depth starting from a given neigbor, and proceeds to the next neighbour only when the exploration in depth from the first one has terminated. 4 A valley-free path is defined as a path that does not cross more than one peering agreements, which are agreements over which two ASes exchange only routes towards respective customers, which is justified by the fact that peering agreement are meant to be free-of-charge for both ASes It is worth noting that, within G links are labeled according to their inferred relationship. For example, assuming that n 1 , n 2 , n 3 are neighbors of 232 node s, in which s is customer ('c') of n 1 , provider ('p') of n 2 and peer with 233 n 3 ; the links (s, n 1 ), (s, n 2 ), and (s, n 3 ) are labeled as 'c2p ', 'p2c' and 'p2p', 234 respectively. With these labels, the regular expression for policy-compliant 235 path then could be leveraged to determine the validity of next hop toward 236 the destination. For instance, taking the customer-type neighbors among 237 the neighbors of s (i.e., n 2 ), and looking at their neighbors x in turn, those 238 (n 2 , x) links are not validated if they are either c2p or p2p because a customer 239 is not expected to grant transit towards its other provider(s) to one among 240 its providers, and a customer is not expected to give access to its peer(s) to 241 its provider(s). By checking the labels of links along the explored path, the 242 validity of next hops can be determined. Once a valid path is discovered, 243 it is enqueued into P for the next discovering phase. The same exploration 244 and validation processes are repeated for all the paths in P until reaching 245 destination d or the path length goes over a given threshold τ . can therefore be simply referred to as a process of source-destination pair se-266 lection. In the following, we define the target set of AS nodes which we 267 9 Algorithm 1: Path Search Algorithm input : source s, destination d, graph g output:
ValidPathSet.append(NewPath) end if length(N ewP ath) = τ + 1 then break queue.append(NewPath) end VisitedNode.add(v) end end consider for attaching the end hosts. A simulation process is then described 268 in details explaining which communication scenarios are covered in our study.
269
The current Internet ecosystem is composed of more than 70 thousand 270 ASes, out of which the large majority are stub ASes, i.e., ASes that are only 271 origin or destination ASes. About 13% are Tier-3 or small Tier-2 ASes, we 272 arbitrary define in this paper as those appearing at most in the third from last 273 position and at least penultimate position in BGP AS paths; we refer to such 274 ASes as 'edge provider' ASes, which can be considered as a representative set 275 of national Internet Service Provider (ISPs). Such ASes are often referred to 276 as 'eyeball' ASes. In this paper, an edge provider AS is not a stub AS, but is 277 rather expected to be a regional or national ISP, most of the time (rare are 278 the cases where an international/intercontinental ISP gives Internet access 279 to end-users).
280
Rather than taking into account all possible communications, we tar-281 get the connections among hosts at the edges, performing connections us-282 ing multiple sub-flows such as done with MPTCP. Considering connections 283 between hosts in different countries, we precisely address the MITM robust-284 ness of Internet connections crossing multiple ASes. To precisely determine 285 which communications to cover in our study, we define a target set of source-286 destination pairs that address, in a reasonable yet arbitrary way, the commu-287 nications that may be more sensitive to communication privacy. Our choice 288 of source-destination pairs is as follows:
289
• the source is interconnected to two edge providers in a country.
290
• the destination is not multi-homed, i.e., it is reachable via a single ISP, 291 the one given by the best BGP path from each source edge provider, 292 and belongs to an AS at another country than the one of the source.
293 Figure 3 illustrates an example of how we simulate multipath communi-294 cations accordingly the above policy. For each two arbitrary edge provider 295 ASes in a same country, one source is created (i.e., a dual-homed source).
296
For each edge provider in another country, one destination is paired with 297 the source. Such a pair dual-homed source -single-homed destination de- ber (requiring about one week of computation), it is worth noting that, in As another way to aggregate the MiTM robustness metric computation,
341
we also study a country-level source-destination based aggregation, i.e., lead-342 ing to a robustness metric for a pair of source and destination countries. 
For a given source and destination countries, s and d respectively, the 363 number of source-destination pairs connecting them is equal to: 
Results

376
We report the results obtained for a set of 147 countries, i.e., those coun-377 tries from the United Nations statistics [56] that appear to have at least two 378 distinct edge providers officially based in the country; this automatically ex-379 cludes Greenland territories, very small city-state countries, many African 380 countries and Indonesia. The geographical coverage is given in Figure 5 . In 381 the following sections, we present the statistics for two different MiTM ro-382 bustness metric aggregations, the country source specific one and the country 383 pair one. 
389
• For each such source configuration, we compute the number of disjoint paths to each destination. For each edge provider that is a different 391 country than the source country, one destination is generated.
392
• For a given source, we compute its corresponding robustness metric by 393 taking the average of the number of disjoint paths over all the destina-394 tions.
395
• For each country, a series of MITM robustness metrics is hence gener-396 ated, one for each source.
397
We characterize the resulting series using boxplot distributions (using a 398 0.1% outliers threshold). We overlay over the boxplots the average of the 399 corresponding series with a red square, order them with increasing averages 5 400 from left to right. We report the results in Figure 4 , and with a geographical 401 view in Figure 5 . We express three different viewpoints: counting the number of disjoint paths from the first and the second 410 edge provider, then decreased by those paths that share an AS hop.
411
Taking into account such a view, we assume that additional AS paths 412 can be made available to MPTCP subflows acting at the edge providers 413 level, e.g., by forms of flow path steering and load-balancing.
414
• differential view (Figure 4c ): the differential robustness results, i.e., 
16
The above viewpoints also reflect different levels of trust on the providers.
420
That is, while the edge provider view assumes MITM attacks do not happen 421 at the source and destination edge providers (i.e., there is a high level of trust 422 on those providers), the device view assumes that attacks can happen at the 423 source edge providers, hence revealing a low level of trust in source direct As a general assessment, Figure 4 shows a distribution to be interpreted.
426
For example, one could consider 1.5 as the rough threshold above which the international destinations has a significant variance depending on the origin country. The average robustness ranges from 1 (and less) to 1.6 from a device 438 viewpoint, and from 1 (and less) to 2.5 from an edge provider viewpoint.
439
It is worth noting that the reason why some minimum, and even average 440 values, are below 1, is the partial view over the Internet topology and the 441 incompleteness of inter-AS relationship inference; in fact, these factors make 
461
• The median is mostly higher than the average in the device view, and 462 lower than the average in the edge provider view. This is essentially 463 due to outliers, counted in the average and not in the median.
464
• From the edge provider viewpoint, the maximum value is higher than 
520
• For each such source configuration, we compute the number of disjoint 521 paths to each edge providers located in the destination country.
522
• For a given source, we take the average of the number of disjoint paths 523 over all the destinations to get its source-destination based MiTM ro-524 bustness metric.
525
• For a given source-destination country pair, a series of MiTM robust-526 ness metrics, one for each source, is therefore created.
527
In Figure 7 , we report the CDF of the average MiTM robustness, for all to, e.g., Montenegro and Republic of Congo is extremely low.
563
Considering 1 and 2 as the thresholds for very low (zero) and high (suffi-564 cient) robustness, respectively, a source-destination pair can be classified as:
565
(1) highly robust against MiTM if it has the average robustness level of at 566 least 2, and (2) weak against the MiTM once maintaining the average of 1 567 or lower.
568
We visualize the country-to-country communications in these two classes 569 by mapping them into a geographical map in Figure 9 . To avoid too many 570 lines, we first group countries with respect to their subregion, then converting 571 these country-to-country connections into the corresponding subregion-to-572 subregion connections. Finally, the subregional connections are expressed 573 using lines with different opacity reflecting the portion of country-to-country 574 communications between subregions having the MiTM robustness level less 575 than or equal to 1 as in Figure 9a , and equal to or higher than 2 as in Figure   576 9b.
577
In Figure 9a as zero-robust. Thus, most of the subregions could not be benefit from the 587 deployment of MPTCP to secure their communications with Central Asia.
588
In the sub-regional view of the high robustness group presented in Figure   589 9b, we show the connection lines between sub-regions with more than 50% 
600
(a) regions with more than 30% of country-to-country communications having at most one path (b) regions with more than 50% of country-to-country communications having at least two paths cussed in standardization fora, but finally not standardized; however, 633 some recommendations have been published [39] , and implemented by some vendors (see, e.g., [34] and [13] ). Such multipath mode can be
